First DCA Reverses Trial Court Order Temporarily Enjoining Florida Office of Insurance Regulation From Enforcing 2012 PIP Reform

The First District Court of Appeal issued an opinion today, October 23, 2013, reversing a Leon County trial court’s order temporarily enjoining the Office of Insurance Regulation from enforcing recent amendments to the Florida No-Fault Law in House Bill 119 (“HB 119”).  Among other changes, HB 119 eliminated reimbursement for massage therapy and acupuncture, limited PIP benefits to $2,500 for non-emergency services, and required insureds to seek treatment within 14 days for emergency services, for which up to $10,000 in coverage remains available.

The underlying action for declaratory and injunctive relief was brought by a group of massage therapists, acupuncturists, and chiropractors, as well as a fictitious “John Doe,” representing similarly situated providers, and a fictitious “Jane Doe,” representing “citizens of Florida who are, were, or will be injured as a result of a motor vehicle collision.”  The plaintiffs sought to have certain provisions of HB 119 declared unconstitutional, essentially arguing that the amendments have prevented the “provider plaintiffs” from earning a living. 

A trial court in Leon County entered an order temporarily enjoining the OIR from enforcing certain provisions of HB 119, based solely on the plaintiffs’ argument that the amendments impermissibly restricted citizens’ access to the courts.  This order created a great deal of uncertainty regarding the actions that the OIR was required to take or prohibited from taking, the geographic scope within which it applied, whether insurers could continue to provide coverage under previously approved forms, and what law applies if HB 119 does not. 

The OIR appealed the order, arguing that it contained several procedural defects, and that the plaintiffs lacked standing to assert an “access to the courts” argument. Several trade groups representing the insurance industry and medical providers appeared as amici curiae, urging the appellate court to consider the broad reaching implications of such an injunction. 

Today, the First DCA issued an opinion reversing the temporary injunction, holding that the plaintiffs “made no colorable showing of standing to proceed on the access-to-courts claim.”  The Court explained that “[w]ithout a showing of an actual denial of access to the courts in a specific factual context, the Provider Plaintiffs lack standing to assert this claim.  The real parties in interest – injured motorists whose ability to sue tortfeasors has been impermissibly limited – are absent from this case.” 

Because the court did not rule on the merits of plaintiffs’ access to courts argument, this opinion leaves open the possibility of insureds, or even medical providers, challenging the provisions of HB 119 with respect to a particular claim for reimbursement in another case.  However, the opinion reverses the trial court’s order granting a temporary injunction and removes the uncertainty created by that order.  This opinion is not final until the time for rehearing expires.

The First DCA’s opinion reversing the temporary injunction and order reinstating the automatic stay are attached in PDF format.

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