Brokers After Montgomery: What the Supreme Court’s Trucking Decision Means and How Far It Will Extend

Our transportation and logistics practice helps freight brokers, motor carriers, shippers, and insurers address the legal and operational risks that arise throughout the movement of goods. We assist clients with reviewing and strengthening transportation agreements, developing carrier-selection and risk-management procedures, managing claims, and handling transportation-related litigation. The Supreme Court’s decision in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC provides an important reminder that careful contracting, documentation, and carrier vetting can play a critical role long before a dispute reaches the courtroom.

When a serious trucking accident happens, most people focus on the obvious parties: the driver, the trucking company, and the vehicle involved in the crash. But in many shipments, there is another player behind the scenes: the freight and/or transportation broker.

A freight and/or transportation broker usually does not own the truck, employ the driver, or physically haul the goods. Instead, the broker helps arrange the shipment by connecting the company that needs goods moved with the trucking company that will move them. In practical terms, the broker is the matchmaker.

That role was at the center of the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC.[i]

The case arose from a serious crash in Illinois. Shawn Montgomery was stopped on the side of the road in his tractor-trailer when another truck hit him. He suffered severe and permanent injuries, including the amputation of his leg. The truck was being driven for Caribe Transport II, LLC. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., a freight broker, had arranged the shipment.[ii]

Montgomery sued several parties, including C.H. Robinson. His claim against the broker was simple: C.H. Robinson should not have selected Caribe Transport because the carrier allegedly had a poor safety record. According to Montgomery, Caribe Transport had a “conditional” safety rating from federal regulators, with alleged problems involving driver qualifications, hours of service, vehicle maintenance, and crash history.[iii]

C.H. Robinson responded with a federal-law defense. It argued that Montgomery’s claim was barred by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, usually referred to as the F4A. Although the name sounds like aviation law, the statute also applies to parts of the trucking industry. In broad strokes, the F4A prevents states from interfering with the prices, routes, and services of motor carriers and brokers. Congress passed the law to avoid a patchwork of state rules regulating the transportation industry.[iv]

But Congress did not wipe away all state authority. The F4A includes a safety exception. It preserves the states’ authority to regulate safety “with respect to motor vehicles.” So the key question in Montgomery was this: when someone claims a broker negligently selected an unsafe trucking company, is that really a motor-vehicle safety claim?[v]

The Supreme Court said yes. The Court looked at what Montgomery was actually alleging. He was not asking Illinois to set freight rates. He was not asking the state to dictate shipping routes. He was saying that a broker should use reasonable care before selecting a carrier that will put trucks on public roads. The Court held that this kind of claim concerns motor vehicle safety because it concerns the trucks that will transport the goods.[vi] The Supreme Court did note, however, that the exclusion is limited to safety issues, leaving open for argument, whether certain activities, i.e., ensuring appropriate insurance cover, is considered a “safety” issue or a financial one. [vii]

That ruling does not mean C.H. Robinson is liable. The Supreme Court did not decide whether the broker did anything wrong. It decided only that federal law does not automatically block the claim from moving forward.

For plaintiffs, the decision is significant because it opens the door to state law claims against the broker and discovery into the broker’s role. What did the broker know about the carrier? Did it check the carrier’s safety rating? Did federal safety records show warning signs? Did the broker follow its own procedures? Were any red flags ignored?

For brokers, the message is just as important. Carrier selection is no longer something that can be treated as a paperwork exercise. Brokers should expect their vetting practices to be examined closely after a serious crash. That includes safety-rating checks, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration records, insurance verification, out-of-service history, and internal policies for approving or rejecting carriers.

The decision is especially important in Florida and throughout the Eleventh Circuit. Before Montgomery, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Aspen American Insurance Co. v. Landstar Ranger, Inc. gave brokers a strong argument that these claims were barred by federal law. After Montgomery, that argument is no longer available for negligent-selection claims tied to motor vehicle safety.[viii]

Still, Montgomery is not a blank check for lawsuits against brokers. A plaintiff must still prove the broker acted unreasonably. A broker that can document a careful review of the carrier, including available safety information, will be in a much better position to defend itself. Justice Kavanaugh made that point in his concurring opinion, noting that brokers should be able to defeat claims where they acted reasonably and selected reputable carriers.[ix] More importantly, as the claims against brokers will be based on state law, Plaintiffs will have to prove all the elements of their cause of action, including causation. See, Hodge v. Molson Coors Beverage Co., USA, LLC, 2026 WL 1691357 (11th Cir. June 11, 2026) (Dismissing a Maryland state law claim post Montgomery where there was no legal precedent “indicating a party could face a negligent hiring claim when it was three hops removed from the hiring of the operator…” ).

The decision also leaves some room for future disputes. Montgomery involved a personal-injury claim arising from a highway crash. Courts may still have to decide how far the ruling extends in cases involving cargo theft, property damage, or purely economic losses. Those cases may not involve the same roadway-safety concerns.

The practical takeaway is straightforward. Montgomery does not make brokers insurers of every shipment they arrange. But it does mean brokers cannot rely on the F4A as a blanket shield when the claim is that they negligently selected an unsafe carrier. Going forward, the focus will be on the facts: what the broker knew, what the broker checked, and whether the broker acted reasonably before putting the shipment in motion and understanding your exposure under state law principles will be key.

Businesses involved in freight brokerage, motor-carrier operations, shipping, or transportation insurance should consider reviewing their contracts, carrier-selection procedures, and claims protocols in light of Montgomery. Our attorneys can assist with strengthening transportation agreements, evaluating risk-management practices, managing claims, and defending transportation-related litigation. Contact us to discuss how the decision may affect your operations or existing agreements.

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[i] Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, 608 U.S. ___, 146 S. Ct. 1199 (2026).
[ii] Id. at 1203–04.
[iii] Id. at 1204.
[iv] 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1); Montgomery, 146 S. Ct. at 1203.
[v] 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A); Montgomery, 146 S. Ct. at 1202, 1204.
[vi] Montgomery, 146 S. Ct. at 1204–05.
[vii] Montgomery, 146 S. Ct. at 1205 (“The safety exception saves only a subset of preempted claims: those involving regulations concerning motor vehicle safety. § 14501(c)(2)(A). One can imagine many state laws that are related to motor carrier prices, routes, and services—such as how much a carrier may charge or which highways it may traverse—that have no relationship to safety.”
[viii] See Ye v. GlobalTranz Enters., Inc., 74 F.4th 453 (7th Cir. 2023), abrogated by Montgomery, 146 S. Ct. 1199; Aspen Am. Ins. Co. v. Landstar Ranger, Inc., 65 F.4th 1261 (11th Cir. 2023), abrogated by Montgomery, 146 S. Ct. 1199.
[ix] Montgomery, 146 S. Ct. at 1208–09 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).